acknowledging the important elements of his critique of Kant and Fichte that lead towards the critical theory perspective. Hegel's 'solution' when "confronted with the persisting contradictions in human existence and with the impotence of individuals in the face of situations they have themselves brought about … seems a purely private assertion, a personal peace treaty between the philosopher and an inhuman world."
2 If the argument of Part II of this book is correct, Hegel's 'method' of selfcompleting skepticism, does more than simply reproduce the idea of an absolute subject from the tangle of Kant's and Fichte's reflections on the unity of apperception. Understood as a response to the problem of the deduction of the modern philosophical consciousness, Hegel's skepticism is an attempt not to resolve, but to re-centre the problem of the 'private assertions' of the philosopher, and to pose the difficulty that besets a self-consciously historically situated account of the nature of reason and of society within the project of modernity.
This, at least, is the view of Adorno. Horkheimer thought it possible to acknowledge the importance of Hegel's dialectical method, while consigning his system, together with the systemic ambitions of Kant and Fichte, to a lumber room of philosophies that needed to be bypassed. Adorno and Marcuse, by contrast, both develop a stronger sense of the importance of German idealism in their respective and, to a certain degree, convergent conceptions of the critical theory project.
3
For Adorno, indeed, Hegel's perspective alone is capable of confronting (though not resolving) the crisis of reason typifying much of twentiethcentury thought, which for Adorno breaks down into a dilemma between the false objectivity of the positive sciences on the one hand and an inherently subjectivized notion of ontology on the other. Indeed, only a perspective that has undergone the historically 'educative' stages of the skepticism in the Phenomenology can be adequate to the problem of rationality as the struggle for real 'ways of life' which Horkheimer demands. That adequacy is expressed in Adorno's idea of a negative dialectics.
Reading Lukács
Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of culture in Dialectic of Enlightenment obviously draws on their Marxist roots. However, it does not simply generalize Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, but depends crucially on the notion of 'reification' (Verdinglichung), as this is developed by Lukács in the central essay from History and Class Consciousness, entitled "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat". Lukács here
